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A REPUBLICAN THEORY OF
MINIMAL ENTITLEMENTS
AKHIL REED AMAR**
Let me begin by mapping out what, for this Federalist Soci-
ety audience, I take to be common ground. Pure socialism is
bad. A system of private property, at least up to a point, is
good. A regime in which the state controlled all resources
would threaten both individual liberty and true democracy.
Quite literally, in such a socialist society, the citizen would have
no ground of her own on which to stand, to define herself, and
to resist government tyranny.
I will now move from this common ground to stake out a
position that for this group may seem far less obvious. Private
property is such a good thing that every citizen should have
some. Indeed, a minimal entitlement to property is so impor-
tant, so constitutive, and so essential for both individual and
collective self-governance that to provide each citizen with that
minimal amount of property, the government may legitimately
redistribute property from other citizens who have far more
than their minimal share. But wait-there's more. The notion
of minimal entitlements is not simply constitutive, it is constitu-
tional-not just constitutionally permissible, meaning that the
government may distribute or redistribute to insure every citi-
zen a minimal stake in society, but constitutionally obligatory.
The government must do so. The Constitution does not enact
Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics,l but it does enact Mr.
Thaddeus Stevens's forty acres and a mule.
Now that I have your attention, let me explain. There is a
tradition deep in American constitutional law that I shall refer
to as the "R/republican tradition," with both a lowercase and a
capital "R." This tradition was a driving force behind a number
• This panel was introduced by Stephen F. Williams, Judge, United States Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit.
.. Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
1. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes,J., dissenting).
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of significant political movements that helped shape the Ameri-
can political experience. These include Abraham Lincoln's Re-
publican party in the 1860s (and before it the Free Soil party),
Thomas jefferson's Democratic Republicans at the tum of the
Nineteenth Century, and before that, the ideological platform
of a group of commonwealth writers, most prominently james
Harrington, in England in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth
Centuries.
In this R/republican tradition, there is a recognition that for
one truly to be a citizen in a democracy and to participate in the
democratic process, one needs a minimum amount of indepen-
dence. Economic independence is necessary if the citizen is to
be able 'to deliberate on the common good, the res publica, the
thing public. (Hence the word republicanism.) According to
this tradition, the problem of poor people is that, in a real way,
they have no wills of their own. You may give them the right to
vote, but they will alienate that right. They will sell it either to
rich people or to foreign tyrants. They lack some minimal stake
in society sufficient to connect their own personal interests with
that of the larger public interest. This lack of individual inde-
pendence is one of the reasons that Thomas jefferson was so
concerned about cities and so hostile towards them. He saw cit-
ies as breeding grounds for the kind of urban proletariat that
had no real stake in the common venture.
I suggest that there are two basic ways of dealing with the
R/republican notion that in order for a democracy to work,
people must have a stake in society. The first way is the dark
side-the exclusionary side-of the R/republican vision. It is
the Athenian solution, and I would suggest the original Ameri-
can solution. That solution is to enslave people, to ruthlessly
disfranchise people who do not have property, to adopt poll
taxes and property qualifications. Indeed, human slavery led to
a host ofeconomic rights provisions and property provisions in
the original Constitution. We see economic protection of slav-
ery in the two clauses about importation of slaves.2 We see it in
the Fugitive Slave Clause3 and the three-fifths rule,4 and it is
lurking behind several other clauses in the Constitution.5
2. u.s. CONST. art. I, § 9, d. 1; id. at art. V.
3. [d. at art. IV, § 2, d. 3.
4. [d. at art. I, § 2, d. 3.
5. See generally R. COVER,jUSTICE ACCUSED 150-53 (1975); Diamond, No Call To Glory:
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These clauses are dramatic evidence that economic rights and
property are not necessarily a good thing. We need to ask ques-
tions about their distribution. Who has economic rights? Who
has rights to property? And to how much? And for what
purpose?
Edmund Morgan, in his brilliant book American Slavery, Ameri-
can Freedom,6 elaborated on the seeming paradox that in Seven-
teenth- and Eighteenth-Century America, radical language
about liberty, equality, and the rights of man coexisted in the
same society that enforced a regime of human slavery. But in a
way, it was not a paradox at all because it was the enslavement
of many people that provided the economic well-being of the
rest who constituted the polity. Ironically, slavery provided a
rough equality among whites-they were all equal in being free
men-and enough economic rent to allocate to poor whites to
make them economically independent.
This original R/republican solution was radically modified by
the Civil War and the Thirteenth Amendment.7 The solution to
the problem is no longer the Athenian solution ofenslavement.
It is now an inclusionary solution, a solution that says We the
People of the United States will not allow a degraded caste of
people to exist in our society. It is a solution that provides peo-
ple with inalienable property rights in their own persons. More-
over, I suggest, it is a vision that, especially under section two
of the Thirteenth Amendment,8 provides for forty acres and a
mule. It is a vision that provides a right to sustenance and shel-
ter: minimum sustenance, minimum shelter.
I submit that the standard legal discourse has deradicalized
this Thirteenth Amendment vision, this inclusionary vision.
The people who adopted the Thirteenth Amendment provided
for rights against the world. A martian looking at our Constitu-
tion would probably see the Thirteenth Amendment as its most
radical provision.9 There is no state action requirement, unlike
Thurgood Marshall's Theory on the Intent ofa Pro-Slavery Constitution, 42 VAND. L. REV. 93
(1989).
6. E. MORGAN, AMERICAN SLAVERY, AMERICAN FREEDOM (1975).
7. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1 ("Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except
as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist
within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.").
8. Id. at § 2 ("Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate
legislation.").
9. So does at least one comparativist. See Damaska, Reflections on American Constitution-
alism, 38 AM. J. COMPo L. - (forthcoming 1990).
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just about every other provision in the Constitution. We fought
a civil war over the slavery issue. The Thirteenth Amendment
radically changed the social and economic structure of our soci-
ety. The people who adopted it did not know that the Four-
teenth and the Fifteenth Amendments were going to follow.
They thought the Thirteenth Amendment was quite broad.
Moreover, I submit that, if anything, we should read the Thir-
teenth Amendment even more broadly in'the wake of the later
adoption of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.
When the Reconstruction Amendments are viewed as a
,whole, a radically different vision of society emerges. Precisely
because the Fifteenth Amendment gave former slaves the right
to vote,IO and the Fourteenth Amendment made them citizens
by dint of their birth, II we should interpret the Thirteenth
Amendment to guarantee each American a certain minimum
stake in society. Otherwise, We the People of the United States
really failed to set the slaves free-free from economic depen-
dence. Without guaranteeing independence, it would have
been both futile and dangerous under R/republican principles
to have extended the rights ofequal citizenship and equal votes
to freedmen. Thaddeus Stevens and his allies, for example, had
policies of subsidized public education, of land redistribution
in the South-forty acres and a mule-and of homesteading in
the West-160 acres in the Homestead ACt. I2
The connection is clear between the educational vision of
Brown v. Board of Education 13 and that of Thaddeus Stevens.
Equally clear is the fact that the new economic rights under the
Reconstruction Amendments are redistributive, at least in part.
Land reform in the South redistributed property rights. In-
deed, the Thirteenth Amendment itself effected the most mas-
sive deprivation of slaveholder property without just
compensation imaginable, notwithstanding the Takings
Clause. I4 Public education can also be seen as redistributive.
10. See u.s. CONST. amend. XV, § 1.
11. See id. at amend. XIV, § 1.
12. The Homestead Act of 1862, ch. 75, 12 Stat. 392 (1862) (repealed 1976); see J.
BLUM, E. MORGAN, W. ROSE, A. SCHLESSINGER,JR. & K. STAMPP, THE NATIONAL EXPERI-
ENCE 362 (3d ed. 1973); see also MEMORIAL ADDRESSES ON THE LIFE AND CHARACTER OF
THADDEUS STEVENS (1869).
13. 347 U.S. 483 (1954); see id. at 493 (education "is the very foundation of good
citizenship").
14. U.S. CONST. amend. V; see also id. at amend. XIV, § 3 (voiding all claims for
shareholder compensation).
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Wealthy people pay more school taxes than poor people, but
poor children are no less entitled to public education. In the
West, we did not auction off lands to the highestbidder. Be-
hind the homesteading provisions there was a distributional vi-
sion of giving subsidized land to folks if they were going to .
farm their own homesteads.
What happens when there is no longer enough land left? The
availability of such land, of course, was assumed by]ohn Locke
in his famous Lockean proviso. 15 I suggest that there is a con-
nection between the "safety valve" of western land 100 years
ago and language about the "safety net" today, language about
trying to create situations in which everyone has a minimum
stake in society. It is interesting to note that soon after the clos-
ing of the West around 1890, Americans adopted the Sixteenth
Amendment, which provides not simply for an income tax, but
a predictably progressive-that is, a redistributive-income tax. 16
Professor Epstein has made some arguments about how the
Federalist Constitution was anti-redistributive. 17 His argument,
as I understand it, is not so much textual as structural, looking
to the ideological background of the Framers of the Constitu-
tion. If one is going to engage in that level of generality in con-
stitutional interpretation for the original Constitution, then to
be consistent, to be a principled interpretivist, one has· to be
willing to do the same thing when looking at the Thirteenth,
Fourteenth, Fifteenth, and Sixteenth Amendments. One then
has to recognize that these amendments were motivated by a
rather different vision ofeconomics and democracy than that of
the original Constitution.
Let me end with several quick caveats, lest I be understood to
be making an even broader argument than I intend to. First,
the notion of minimal entitlements is not a notion that every-
one should have an equal amount of property. It is more a
Thirteenth Amendment vision than a Fourteenth Amendment
vision. It is not an argument that equal protection under the
Fourteenth Amendment means equal property, but rather that
freedom under the Thirteenth Amendment implies a notion of
some minimal entitlement. So to the exte.nt that many members
15. J. LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT, § 27 (T. Peardon ed. 1952)
(1st ed. London 1690).
16. See Amar, Our Forgotten Constitution, 97 YALE LJ. 281, 291-92 (1987).
17. See generally R. EpSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT
DOMAIN (1985).
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of this audience find freedom a more compelling ideal than
equality, they should welcome my invitation to shift our focus
from the Fourteenth to the Thirteenth Amendment.
Second, this vision is not a socialist one. It celebrates the no-
tion ofprivate property but suggests that we have to extend the
benefits of that institution to all citizens of society. This is the
vision of Charles Reich in his classic article on the new prop-
erty.18 It might suggest some implications for the Rodriguez
casel9 dealing with a right to a minimally adequate public edu-
cation, or for voucher systems in employment and education-
not a socialist system, in which people have equal property
rights in each other's incomes.
Third, forty acres and a mule is not a dole. It is not welfare. It
is much more like workfare. Forty acres and a mule do not yield
a harvest without labor, and in the process oflaboring, a citizen
can gain self-respect and the respect of others. We must re-
member that our goal is to create independent citizens. Ironically,
many current welfare programs may have moved us away from
that goal by perpetuating cycles of dependency. By contrast,
the kind of education and job-training programs I am advocat-
ing here are designed to promote self-sufficiency and reward
hard work.
Fourth, I have not, at least here, argued that this Thirteenth
Amendment vision of forty acres and a mule is judicially en-
forceable under section one of the Thirteenth Amendment.
There may very well be a variety of institutional limitations on
courts that make them unsuitable for the task.20 Rather, I
would like to stress the obligation-not only a moral obliga-
tion, but a legal, a constitutional obligation-of Congress, under
section two of the Thirteenth Amendment. Congress has both
a constitutional right and a constitutional duty to implement
this vision.
Perhaps the legal obligation argument can be pushed even
further. Unlike virtually every other constitutional provision,
the Thirteenth Amendment creates rights against, and thus im-
poses duties on, private citizens. Even if courts for institutional
18. See Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE LJ. 733 (1964).
19. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
20. See generally Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107,
175-77 (1976); Michelman, Welfare Rights in a Constitutional Democracy, 1979 WASil.
U.L.Q, 659; Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91
fuRV. L. REV. 1212 (1978).
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reasons cannot directly and fully enforce these duties, each of
us may well have an obligation as a citizen to help assure each
of our fellow citizens some minimal entitlements. ,We might be
able to discharge this obligation in any number of ways-for
example, by giving our time or money to private programs and
intermediate associations (churches, charities, schools, and so
on) that seek to provide minimal entitlements of education and
property to our co-citizens. But once again, perhaps this obli-
gation to be "points of light" is not merely a moral one, but a
legal, a constitutional, duty as well.
Finally, I am not rejecting, but simply modifying, the three
basic procedural notions of prospectivity, generality, and non-
discrimination, said by some to underlie our constitutional
scheme of property protection. Prospectivity has to be comple-
mented by a vision of substantive baselines. Prospectivity, or
non-retroactivity, says that whatever existing property rights
you have must be respected prospectively. But we need a the-
ory about initial baseline entitlements-starting points. We
need a theory about the birthrights of inheritance of every
American citizen. That is what the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and
Fifteenth Amendments are all about: birthrights ofevery Amer-
ican citizen.
The proposition about generality must be supplemented by a
vision of independence of citizens. The way to create that inde-
pendence is to give every citizen a stake in society. This is good
both for the individual and collective self-governance, much as
freedom of speech can be derived from both an individual the-
ory of personhood, autonomy, and self-expression, and also
from a theory of democratic self-rule. So whether we begin
with a vision of individual dignity and human rights, or (as I
have here) stress the structural requirements of R/republican
government, we are led to the idea of guaranteed minimal
entitlements.
Last, the notion of nondiscrimination-which is often assimi-
lated by people like Professor Epstein to non-redistribution-
has to be qualified by the need to accommodate modest. redis-
tribution so that we can make real today the vision of forty
acres and a mule for every American.
